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TAKING SELVES SERIOUSLY 
By  
Susan T. Gardner 
 
In his inaugural address entitled Multiculturalism: The Politics of Recognition presented at 
the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University in 1990, Charles Taylor 
argues that a person suffering from the lack of adequate recognition is an evil that can be 
ranked in the same echelons of harm as inequality, exploitation, and injustice.1  This is 
so, Taylor argues, because people’s identities are established as a function of what can be 
negotiated in the public sphere. Thus, misrepresentation, or lack of representation, can 
produce distorted and negative identities that can result in extreme psychological suffering 
and faulty life plans—something feminists, and others, have been arguing for decades.2 It 
is for that reason, that Taylor argues that due recognition “is not just a courtesy we owe 
people. It is a vital human need.”3 
 
Having thus made the case that non-recognition or misrecognition, “can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone is a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being,”4 Taylor 
goes on to briefly review the potential clash that this “self fact” sets up between “the 
politics of equal dignity” (which is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of 
respect, regardless of gender, skin colour, sexual orientation, etc.) and the “politics of 
difference” which objects to the difference-blind fashion5 that the former advocates, and 
argues instead that “we have to recognize and even foster particularity.”6 This, in turn, 
leads to the notion that, since an individual’s identity may be tied to her culture, cultures 
(rather than mere individuals) have legitimate claims to recognition. Taylor cites, as an 
example, the French-Canadian bid for recognition as a “distinct society” which has clashed 
with the “difference-blind” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
 
Taylor also analyzes how the dynamics of self-recognition makes a serious claim on what 
counts as adequate educational material. That is, if the struggle for freedom and equality 
must pass through individual identity-formation, it seems to follow that concerted efforts 
ought to be made to include, for example, Afrocentric texts in mainly black schools7 and 
authors other than dead white males in university humanities departments. Taylor, and 
others, goes to considerable length in analyzing the latter issue, i.e., the degree to which the 
established canon must be modified so as to accede to the demands of multiculturalists.  
  
 
1  Taylor 1994, p. 64. 
2 Thus, Taylor says that people can suffer real damage “if the people or society around them mirror back to 
them a confining or contemptible picture of themselves.” Ibid., p. 25. 
3 Ibid., p. 26. 
4 Ibid., p. 25. 
5 Ibid., p. 43. 
6 Ibid., p. 43. 
7 Ibid., p. 65. 
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What is particularly interesting about Taylor’s analysis and, indeed, the whole movement 
of the “Politics of Recognition” that it has spawned, is that it counts “the integrity of 
individual self-consciousness” as a genuine human good, along with more obvious 
physical goods such as lack of overt oppression and equal access to social opportunities.  
What is distressing, however, about Taylor’s analysis and its associated movement, 
(which, ironically, may suffer from a “recognition failure” due to “adultist” and “sexist” 
attitudes) is that it is blind to the enormity and depth of the educational transformation that 
must be undertaken in primary and secondary school systems (rather than just re-jigging 
a few materials for university, or even regional school, consumption) if we are going to do 
more than merely pay lip-service to the fact that the self really is a product of recognition.8   
 
Since the notion of “self as dialogue” was systematically articulated by George Herbert 
Mead in the 1930’s, and discussed at length by John Dewey in his writings about education 
and democracy around the same period, both these authors have much to say about 
educational obligations that this notion spawns.  Rousseau, also speaks to this issue, as 
does Piaget, and (tangentially) Ronald Dworkin in his article Liberalism, and his book 
Taking Rights Seriously—the template of that title being borrowed for this paper.  
 
Using a weave of these authors, along with a tribute to Philosophy for Children founder 
Matthew Lipman for his heroic efforts to relocate philosophy’s potential transformative 
power from the exclusive elitist halls of esoteric post-secondary education to the “common 
kids” in the K-12 system, it will be argued in what is to follow that, if we really are going 
to take the formation of selves seriously as Taylor would have us do, then, with regard to 
education, we are obligated to do A LOT more than the sort of window dressing that 
Taylor and his commentators muse about. If we take “the self as dialogue” seriously, we 
are going to have to transform our system of schooling from the bottom up so as to create 
an environment that, in Neil Portman’s words, not only prepares our youngsters for making 
a living, but as well, for making a life,9 i.e., we are going to have to create—wait for it—a 
dialogical environment that puts youngsters firmly on the road to taking charge of their 
own self-formation in dialogue with others.10 Such an environment would be in sharp 
contrast to the hedonistic, hyper sexualized, treacherously balkanized, conformist inducing, 
materialistic, drug soaked, mindless, self-stultifying and often literally dangerous 




8 Thus, for example, in her introduction to Taylor(1994), Gutman says that “a primary aim of liberal arts 
universities is not to create bookworms, but to cultivate people who are willing and able to be self-governing 
in both their political and personal lives,” p. 17. In light of the fact that only a small fraction of the world’s 
youngsters spend a significant amount of time in liberal arts departments of universities, and in light of the 
fact that those who are there are already adults and hence have already established strong habits of mind, one 
wonders why it is not evident that merely focusing on what should be taught in liberal arts universities is 
short-sighted. And elsewhere Gutman says “Colleges and universities can serve as models for deliberation by 
encouraging rigorous, honest, open, and intense intellectual discussions, both inside and outside the 
classroom, p. 23. Is this not closing the barn door after most of the herd has left?  
9 Postman 1995, p. x. 
10  In emphasizing this “self fact,” Taylor says: “We need relationships to fulfill, but not to define, ourselves,” 
1994, p. 33. And “We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometime in struggle against, the things 
our significant others want to see in us,” p. 33. And “My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical 
relations with others,” p. 34. 
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The self as a function of others 
 
 It is crucial that we begin our analysis by noting that when Mead claims that the self 
develops as a result of dialogue, he is not saying merely that one’s self-evaluation is 
influenced by the judgment of others (a thesis that sometimes seems to waft through 
discussion of the Politics of Recognition). What Mead is saying, rather, is something much 
more profound and that is that self-consciousness as such quite literally develops because 
of, and only because of, social interaction. Without interaction, in other words, there would 
be no self-consciousness—a theory, by the way, that is empirically supported by 
experiment carried out by Gallup11 who showed that the self-consciousness evident in 
chimps as measured by mirror-related activities is absent in chimps that are raised in 
isolation.  
 
In what, though, precisely, does this emerging self-consciousness consist? Mead describes 
this emerging self-consciousness as an emerging awareness that there is a correlation 
between the changing affect (or response) of the other and particular units of one’s own 
behaviour. A young child, in other words, becomes aware of her actions through the fact 
that a change in the behaviour, verbal response, and/or attitude of the other sends the 
message that her actions are positively or negatively valued by that other. Thus, according 
to Mead, self-consciousness, rather than being some mysterious metaphysical exudate of 
the brain, is rather an awareness of one’s behaviour through the fact that it is valued either 
positively or negatively by others. And Mead goes on to say, as is an inevitable corollary 
of his original hypothesis, that self-conscious is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but is, 
rather, a matter of degree, and that that degree is a function of the number of different 
evaluative viewpoints that the agent can entertain at any one time.  
 
We can turn to Piaget for a physical analogical look at what Mead had in mind with regard 
to the development of the self. In Piaget’s famous conservation experiment,12 if a young 
child, before approximately six years of age, let’s call her Janie, watches the same amount 
of water being poured first into a tall slim glass and then into a short fat glass, and is then 
asked which glass has more, her answer will depend on which dimension is more salient: 
height or width. But Janie will definitely say that either the taller glass has more or the 
wider has more, despite the fact that she saw the same amount of water being poured into 
each glass.  
 
After the age of six, when Janie is able to take into account more than one dimension at 
any one time AND because she has acquired a more sophisticated vocabulary, she will say 
that the amount in the different glasses has the same volume, despite the fact that they look 
dissimilar. What is important to note here is that to move to this level, Janie needs to be 
able to hold at least two dimensions in her mind at the same time (i.e., height and width) 
AND she needs a vocabulary that can move her to a higher level of abstraction (i.e., the 
concept of volume). This change in perception that is picked up in Piaget’s conservation 
experiment parallels Mead’s theory of the development of the self which he describes as 
moving from the play stage,13 when a child can take into account the viewpoint of only one 
 
11 Gallup 1977. 
12 Ginsberg and Opper 1969. 
13 Mead 1934. 
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other at any one time, to the game stage in which the child can take into account a number 
of viewpoints through plugging them into an abstract game plan. This development of the 
self, or perhaps more precisely, this development of reflected evaluative self-perception, 
can be described as a process of quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading.14   
 
If this analysis of self-consciousness is correct (a version of which Taylor and his 
commentators seem to accept), then it has radical consequences for the point and 
motivation of taking the viewpoints of others into account. That is, it suggests that 
advocates for the Politics of Recognition are missing the point when they argue that we 
ought to communicate across divides because to do so is what is demanded by the moral 
command that we respect others. The deeper message that this social theory of self-
consciousness sends is that we ought to communicate across divides also because to do so 
is what is demanded by the moral command that we respect ourselves, i.e., because this is 
the communicative engine that fuels self-development.   
 
This notion that respect for others and respect for oneself are fused finds an echo in W.F. 
Lofthouse’s book, Ethics and the Family15.  Written in 1912, and foreshadowing Mead’s 
theory of the social inception of the self, Lofthouse argues that we misunderstand 
humanity by our individualistic interpretation of human nature which inevitably leads us to 
assume that egoism and altruism are incompatible. Lofthouse argues that if we recognize 
that humans are essentially social, then seeking the justified approval of others (which 
appears egoistic) will push us to seeking ever expanded and increasingly impartial 
perspectives of both one’s own and others’ viewpoints since, in so doing, we will create for 
ourselves a larger space to do as we like without bumping up against the justified 
disapproval of others. (It is important to keep in mind here that it is justified disapproval, 
not just disapproval per se, that wounds—or that should wound.) Lofthouse asks us to look 
at the family which, at its best, nurtures an “attitude which is neither egoism or altruism, 
but something deeper and higher than both.”16 
 
Educational implications of a social self. 
 
This notion that self-development is fuelled by reflectively considering different viewpoints 
has radical implications with regard to early schooling. Indeed, given the fact that Taylor 
references Mead in the article under consideration, and given the fact that, in his book 
Sources of the Self: The Making of The Modern Identity written a year earlier, he explicitly 
says that “a self exists only in ‘webs of interlocution’”17 and that “We find the sense of life 
through articulating it,” and that “how much sense there is for us depends upon our power 
of expression,”18 it is odd that he fails to speak to the educational implications of self-
identity except insofar as they inform decisions about what university Humanities 
Departments ought to include in their curricula. This oddness is exacerbated by his 
frequent reference to Rousseau who was so famously concerned about what kind of people 
childhood—not universityhood—produces.19 Indeed, Rousseau seems to have 
 
14 Gardner 1981. 
15 Lofthouse 1912, p. 164. 
16 Ibid., p. 168 
17 Taylor 1989, p. 33. 
18 Ibid., p. 18. 
19 Rousseau 1993. 
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contemporary education directly in mind when he says (quoted by Taylor) 20 that if we are 
serious about combating the desire for the kind of preferential esteem that solidifies 
divides, we have an urgent moral obligation to rectify the personality-changing atmosphere 
of our schools which feed into hierarchical honour systems in which “one person’s glory 
must be another person’s shame, or at least obscurity.”  
 
In his book Democracy and Education, John Dewey likewise argues that personality 
transformation ought to be the focus of our schools. He argues that primary/secondary 
schooling systems that focus mainly on information transfer and preparation for the 
workplace have lost their legitimacy. It is absolutely critical, rather, that schooling systems 
recognize that, whether they like it or not, they are in the business of self-creation.21  
 
Another way of putting Dewey’s point would be to say that if we are concerned about the 
kind of selves that are being created in childhood, as well as the habits of mind that strive 
to communicate across that which divides us (these two being flip sides of the same coin), 
then we must focus on the process that feeds the educational experience, and in particular, 
we need to enhance the quantity and quality of intersubjective interchange throughout our 
school systems.22  
 
And the problem is not just that reflective self-governance is endangered by our lack of 
emphasis on quality cooperative enquiry in our school systems. The more serious moral 
indictment is that we are quite literally stunting the growth of our youngsters’ selves 
through lack of genuine reflective exposure to alternative perspectives that would nudge 
our youngsters toward what Gadamer refers to as the “fusing of horizons.” And it is this 
fact, that selves can only grow as a function of quantitative expansion and qualitative 
upgrading, that this call for this kind of educational transformation is, importantly, 
immune to the charge that this is merely a Western Imperialist stunt that is motivated by 
the goal of further entrenching dominant and hegemonic power interests. The point of 
promoting free and open inquiry with regard to all ways of seeing the world is not, or not 
just, about enhancing greater ethical understanding of the sort that Amy Gutman refers to 
in the Preface to Taylor’s article23.  The point is to create an environment that quite 
literally nudges the growth of selves.24 
 
20 Taylor 1994, p. 48. 
21 “The school has the function also of coordinating within the disposition of each individual the diverse 
influences of the various social environments into which he enters. One code prevails in the family; another, 
on the street; a third, in the workshop or store; a fourth, in the religious association. As a person passes from 
one of the environments to another, he is subjected to antagonistic pulls, and is in danger of being split into a 
being having different standards of judgment and emotion for different occasions. This danger imposes upon 
the school a steadying and integrating office,” Dewey, 2007b, p. 21.  “Beware of disciplinary training rather 
than personal development,” Ibid., p. 73.  
22“ Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is 
the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked,” 
Ibid., p. 133. “Education in a democracy cannot be justified solely by its potential for material output,” Ibid., 
p.  93. 
23 Gutman 1994, p. xiii. 
24 Though it should be noted that Gutman herself notes that changing to a multicultural curriculum will do 
little in terms of promoting cross-cultural understanding if these books are not taught in the spirit of free and 
open inquiry. And she goes to say that “liberal education fails if intimidation leads to blind acceptance of 
those visions or if unfamiliarity leads us to blind rejection.” 
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In his article Liberalism, and in his book Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin argues that a 
liberal society ought not to espouse any substantive view of what counts as the good life, 
but rather ought to remain firmly committed to the procedural commitment to treat people 
with equal respect,25 thereby allowing what counts as a good life to evolve out of dialogue. 
Given the framework outlined here, it is interesting to note that this distinction between 
substantive and procedural ethical commitments appears to collapse because the 
commitment to a dialogue-enhancing procedure becomes, from the point of view of self-
development, a substantive view of what counts as a good life, i.e., one that maximizes 
self-development, though not one tied to any particular culture.  
 
Answering our educational responsibility 
 
This then, surely is the clarion call for Philosophy for Children (referred to by its advocates 
as P4C), a pedagogical initiative founded by philosopher Matthew Lipman. Unlike its 
postsecondary parent that tends to focus on information-transfer (i.e., information about 
the history of philosophy), Philosophy for Children anchors its pedagogy in a process 
called a community of enquiry in which students, under the tutelage of a philosophically-
trained facilitator, engage in (returning to Dewey’s words, this time from his book How We 
Think), “Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of 
knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which 
it tends.”26  As well, and this is key, the topics discussed are always those picked by the 
participants. By thus focusing on issues that challenge participants where they live, an 
environment is created in which participants learn to articulate reasoned support for what 
they actually believe and, as well, are required to hear differing viewpoints, defended often 
passionately by others, thus creating an atmosphere which is precisely the kind that bumps 
up self-transformation of the sort described by Mead and tangentially advocated by 
scholars of the Politics of Recognition. This also, however, paradoxically, is P4C’s 
weakness because those who associate philosophy with discussions of Aristotle, Kant, and 
Hume, apparently can’t seem to help but look down with derision on a practice that would 
have its participants scrutinize such topics as whether it is OK to snitch on a classmate, or 
gossip about a friend, or engage in physical or verbal bullying, or cheat on an exam. This 
derision, of course, is compounded by the fact that working with young minds that are 
housed in bodies not old enough to gain membership in the honoured elitist institution of 
the university is seen as of little consequence either simply because they are children 
and/or because working with children is seen as women’s work (hence the original charge 
that it is adultism and/or sexism that prevents advocates of the Politics of Recognition from 





Adultism and sexism, however, may not be the only or even the most effective poison that 
keeps killing Dewey’s plea, made over 100 years ago, that, in our school systems, we 
ought to focus on process thinking and character formation rather information transfer and 
 
25 Quoted by Taylor 1994, p. 56. 
26 Dewey 2007a, p. 7. 
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skill enhancement. The real killer may be the worry that wafts through and around Taylor’s 
claim that “a person suffering from the lack of adequate recognition is an evil that can be 
ranked in the same echelons of harm as inequality, exploitation, and injustice.” If identity 
claims are indeed as crucial as Taylor attests, then it would seem, if we are to avoid 
perpetrating inequality, exploitation, and injustice that we are called upon to recognize 
others as they define themselves. But if this is the case, putting philosophy in the hands of 
children could be characterized as the psychological equivalent of arming them with 
weapons of mass destruction. After all, children engaged in genuine inquiry will 
undoubtedly seriously question the values that underpin the identity of others, which, in 
turn, could potentially shred the attitudes of acceptance that Multiculturalism and the 
Politics of Recognition appear to advocate. It is much safer, is it not, to send out a clear 
message that we all ought to be maximally tolerant, i.e., that none of us ought to stand in 
judgment of others—an attitude, by the way, that our youngsters have embraced in spades, 
as is evidenced by a 2009 survey of Canadian teens, reported in the August 14 edition of 
The Vancouver Sun, that disclosed that 64% of Canadian teens agreed with the statement 
that “what’s right or wrong is a matter of personal opinion”27—an attitude that is 
materially reflected in the decision made by David Cash, a Berkeley University 
engineering student, who, in 1997, chose to turn the other way as his friend raped and then 
drowned a 7 year old girl, and who then proudly proclaimed that what his friend did had 
nothing to do with him and that it was not his place to judge.28 
 
This is the ugly flip-side of the Politics of Recognition that has fed into the post-modern 
relativist message that carries the implicit assumption that all selves, and all cultures with 
which selves identify, must be of equal worth because there is no objective standard by 
which to differentiate some selves or viewpoints as more worthy than others. “Respect for 
persons,” therefore, demands that we all ought to forswear from the odious practice of 
standing in judgment over anyone else.  
 
The difficulty with this otherwise laudable goal of trying to respect all persons is that 
refusing to recognize that selves can have more worth than others is to refuse to recognize 
that selves can develop, and it is to refuse to recognize that the notion of development 
carries with it the implicit assumption that the more development the better. This notion of 
development, in other words, carries the message that we are sorely misguided if we focus 
on selves as static things that require maintenance through mirroring. This notion of 
development, rather, argues that we must recognize that present selves are a product of past 
communication, and that for all selves, the ultimate good is not the preservation of its 
present mosaic, but, rather, the goal is for all selves to acquire the capacity and courage to 
engage in the sort of communication which maximizes the potential for growth.  Or, to put 
a Deleuzian twist on it, one might say that there is always something outside our 
identifications as subjects or persons, which we play out through complexifying 
encounters29—that living together well requires creation30 and bold experimentation31 
rather than the sad withered task of ratifying the status quo.32 
 
27 Todd 2009, pp. A1 and A7.  
28 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Strohmeyer 
29 May 2008, p. 161. 
30 Ibid., p. 134. 
31 Ibid., p. 68. 
32 Ibid., p. 57. 
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Communication that nudges mutual self-development, of course, is tough stuff. This is not 
the namby pamby, self-esteem boosting, mutual-ego-messaging of everyone’s opinion 
being as good as everyone else’s. Nor is it the sort that gives greater worth and welcome to 
opinions expressed by members of victimized groups thereby assuaging the guilt of those 
not similarly harmed. This is, rather, the sort of communicative action of which Habermas 
speaks in which the offering of justification is the ticket of admission for any opinion, and 
the potential prize of mutual acceptance is not a function of good will but rather a function 
of the degree to which opinions withstands falsification.  This, interestingly, is not far from 
Taylor’s own words when he says, in his Sources of the Self, that frameworks (which 
define who we are) supersede one another in error-reducing moves,33 i.e., that selves 
develop as a function of epistemic gain.34  
 
The corollary of this claim that self and truth are tied tightly together is, of course, that 
communicating across divides may not be possible. If like a young Piagetian child, I 
perceive amounts by estimating height only, while you perceive amounts in terms of 
volume, your perception of the world is more adequate than mine. And it also follows that 
if I refuse to engage in communication that would reveal the inadequacy of my viewpoint, 
then, unhappily, there is no way that our “horizons are going to be fused.”  We must, in 
other words, take the words of Martin Buber seriously when he says in lovely book I and 
Thou35 that we can only meet in the in-between, i.e., that respect does not demand that I try 
to manipulate myself into accepting your worldview despite the fact that I find it faulty—it 
does not mean that open-mindedness is the same as empty-mindedness, or in Dewey’s 
words, it does not mean that we carry around a sign saying “Come right in; there is no one 
at home.”36 Respect, or what Dewey refers to as “hospitality,” requires, rather, that I am 
willing to welcome you into my world view and that I am equally willing to accept a 
similar offer from you, but that ultimately, the best that I can do is to wait for you on the 
bridge of genuine communication—a territory, by the way, at least according to Axel 





33 Taylor 1989, p. 101. 
34 Ibid., p. 72. 
35 Buber 1958. 
36 Dewey 2007b, p. 133. 
37 According to Honneth (1995), “the history of the human spirit is to be understood as a conflictual process 
(or, referencing Hegel as “a series of rectifications of destroyed equilibria) in which the ‘moral’ potential 
inherent in natural ethical life . . . is gradually generalized” (15). And “It is not the case, therefore, that a 
contract puts an end to the struggle for survival. Rather, inversely, this struggle leads, as a moral medium, 
from an underdeveloped state of ethical life to a more mature level of ethical relations” (17). And I must be 
prepared to show that I will die for who I believe that I think I am.  This is “a life and death struggle” (23). 
And “it is only because human subjects are incapable of reacting in emotionally neutral ways to social 
injuries—as exemplified by physical abuse, the denial of rights, and denigration—that the normative patterns 





Let me summarize, then, against the words of Amy Gutman who says at the end of her 
introduction to Taylor’s article, that  
“Mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability to articulate our 
disagreements, to defend them before people with whom we disagree, to discern the 
difference between respectable and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to 
changing our minds when faced with well-reasoned criticism,”38  and—that “the moral 
promise of multiculturalism depends on the exercise of these deliberative virtues.” 
 
The points that I am trying to make here are tangential to Gutman’s position in six ways: 
I am claiming that 
1) It is not multiculturalism and or increased understanding across divides that is the 
primary justification for nurturing deliberative virtues, but rather the potential for self-
development and, therefore that 
2) The emphasis implicitly put on the importance of other-recognition by the Politics of 
Recognition potentially undermines its motivation in that it carries the arrogant implication 
that I am doing you a favour by listening to you, rather then explicitly recognizing that 
such interchange, if successful, will be mutually self-beneficial, i.e., that it is through the 
self-development spawned by genuine communication that altruism and egoism collapse, 
to say nothing of the fact that 
3) The emphasis put on other-recognition by the Politics of Recognition can be 
dangerously misleading in its tendency to fuel an over-acceptance of the unfounded 
positions of others and an under-acceptance of the obligation is to genuinely challenge 
(though its mirror virtue, paradoxically, of accepting challenge seems widely recognized), 
and that 
4) We ought to expect that all positions may not be equally valid and that therefore the 
dream of a liberalist heaven on earth in which all that all cultures have to offer are found to 
be mutually acceptable is no more plausible or honorific than a world in which everyone’s 
opinion is as good as everyone else’s, but that   
5) Because this kind of tough communicative interchange that challenges and accepts 
challenge and in which the least worthy options are dropped off the table39 is necessary for 
the development of the self, promoting such communication all around, and particularly in 
our youngsters, is immune from the charge that this is merely a mirror of a Western 
imperialist liberal idiosyncratic culture; and finally that 
6) If we really are going to take the development of the self as a primary good and hence a 
human right, as the Politics of Recognition seems to advocate, and if we take rights 
seriously as Dworkin would have us do, then we need to take selves seriously and ensure 
that the pedagogical atmosphere in which the selves of the next generation are developing 
is the sort in which the deliberative virtues necessary for the development of the self are 
nurtured. We should, in short, demand that access to programs such as Philosophy for 
Children is a human right.40   
 
38  Gutman 1994, p. 24. 
39 Gardner 2009. 
40  “Results (external answers and solutions) may be hurried; processes may not be forced. They take their 
own time to mature. Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of 
correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching 
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